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On December 7, 1995 two white soldiers from Fort Bragg went into nearby
Fayetteville, North Carolina with semi-automatic weapons, "hunting for
blacks."' The two soldiers succeeded in their intended goal. They shot
Michael James, age 36, and Jackie Burden, age 27, in the head at close range,
killing them. In the soldiers' rooms the police found a Nazi flag, racist
literature, a bombmaking book, and white supremacist paraphernalia.2
News of this event appeared in papers and on television as I was reading
Dinesh D'Souza's The End of Racism.' The brutal murders in North Carolina,
and other incidents,4 underscore the fundamental problem with D'Souza's
book. To put it bluntly, D'Souza does not take seriously anti-black racism in
the United States. Furthermore, while acknowledging that a few bad things
may once have happened, here and there, he rejects history in favor of
polemical and inaccurate statements about the past. He concludes that while
'racism undoubtedly exists,"' it "no longer has the power to thwart blacks or
any other group in achieving their economic, political, and social aspira-
tions."6 Rather, D'Souza trivializes racism in the United States, asserting:
"African Americans suffer slights in terms of taxidrivers who pass them by,
pedestrians who treat them as a security risk, banks that are reluctant to invest
in black neighborhoods, and other forms of continued discrimination."7 Such
a view is only possible if we ignore the soldiers who murdered Michael James
and Jackie Burden, the resurrection of the Ku Klux Klan, the torching of black
churches throughout the South, the attitudes of urban police officers such as the
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Los Angeles Police Department's Stacy Koons and Mark Fuhrman, the recently
exposed attitude and behavior of some Texaco executives, and many other less
publicized but equally disturbing incidents of racism.
D'Souza begins in a promising way, suggesting that "Americans must step
back from the sound and fury long enough to ask some fundamental questions
about race and racism."' Instead of stepping back or offering a reasoned
analysis of our nation's racial problems, D'Souza inveighs against most public
policies regarding race. In laying the groundwork for this attack, he distorts
history beyond recognition, or ignores it altogether. Similarly, he distorts the
present through a selective narrative and a clever presentation of stories and
anecdotes.
Like any good polemic, The End of Racism contains much that appears to
be true. Unfortunately, the book includes much more that is not true or is only
partially true. Sorting through all of this is not an easy task, especially with a
book that runs 700 pages. Who has the time or energy, and what journal would
allow the space, to respond to every inaccuracy and half truth, every slanted
presentation of an event, every display of misinformation, every bit of partial
information that hides some significant nuance or fact? In some ways, this book
is the publishing equivalent of the "big lie": it is impossible to respond to the
entire enterprise.
In this Review, I will discuss in some detail just a few of D'Souza's
assertions and arguments. My goal is to examine the underpinnings of
D'Souza's arguments, particularly those regarding the origin and history of
race relations in America. D'Souza predicates much of his argument on
historical assertions which cannot stand up to careful analysis. If his historical
foundation falls, then so must many of his conclusions about race and
American society.
D'Souza purports to offer new insights into American history and the
history of racism. Along with the Free Press, which published this book, he
offers it as a piece of competent scholarship, claiming that, "it's a serious
book-700 pages, 2,000 footnotes. " 9 But all the footnotes in the world are
meaningless if the sources are flawed or the analysis skewed. Rather than a
serious intellectual work, this is more like a parody of scholarship, where
selected "facts" are pulled out of any recognizable context, and used to support
a particular viewpoint.
I. THE NEw RACISM
The End of Racism embodies the elements of what I characterize as the
8. Id. at 1.
9. Interview with Dinesh D'Souza by Bryant Gumbel, NBC NEWS, Sept. 25, 1995, available in
1995 WL 9128384.
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"new racism," a way of thinking that has become fashionable and acceptable
in some quarters. The "new racism": (1) denies the history of racial oppression
in America; (2) rejects biological racism in favor of an attack on black culture;
and (3) supports formal, de jure equality in order to attack civil rights laws that
prohibit private discrimination and in order to undermine any public policies
that might monitor equality and give it substantive meaning.
A. History Denied
Throughout his book D'Souza denies the significance of past discrimina-
tion. In what are possibly the most astounding conclusions of the book,
D'Souza denies that "[s]egregation was a system established by white racists
for the purpose of oppressing blacks" 10 or that "[s]lavery was a racist
institution."" I will return to these two issues, D'Souza's new history of
segregation and his new history of slavery, in Parts III and IV of this Review,
respectively.
B. Beyond Biology
For now, I would like to comment briefly on D'Souza's move beyond
biology and his advocacy of de jure equality. Unlike generations of Americans
beginning with Thomas Jefferson,' 2 the new racists eschew biological
explanations for different success rates between blacks and whites. D'Souza
ultimately rejects notions of biological inferiority, but it is a tepid, backhanded
rejection. Commenting on The Bell Curve, 3 he writes:
Whatever the book's shortcomings, it remains an undisputed fact that the fifteen-
point IQ difference between blacks and whites has remained roughly constant for
more than three quarters of a century, even though the environmental conditions for
African Americans have vastly improved during that period. It is possible to reject
the fatalism of genetic theories of IQ differences, as I do. 4
This partial rejection of notions of biological racism comes at the end of a
forty-five page chapter, provocatively titled "The Content of Our Chromo-
somes," in which D'Souza repeats at great length, but does not directly
challenge, most of the arguments of those who offer biological defenses of
racial superiority.
In stepping away from scientific racism, the "new racism" offers a cultural
10. D'SouzA, supra note 3, at 2.
11. Id.
12. For examples of Jefferson's racism, see THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF
VIRGINIA 138-43 (William Peden ed., 1954). See also PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE
FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 105-69 (1996).
13. RICHARD HERNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS
STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994).
14. D'SouzA, supra note 3, at 475.
Yale Law & Policy Review
argument, lumping together all African Americans in a way that looks
suspiciously like a repackaged version of the old racism. Thus, D'Souza talks
about "the behavior of the African American underclass, which flagrantly
violates and scandalizes basic codes of responsibility, decency, and civility." 5
He fails to define this "underclass" but asserts that, for many whites, it
"represents a revival of barbarism in the midst of Western civilization. " 16 He
then easily moves from discussing the "African American underclass" to "the
performance and conduct of African Americans," presumably extending his
analysis beyond the underclass. He argues that "[i]f blacks can close the
civilization gap, the race problem in this country is likely to become
insignificant. " 17
The "new racism" substitutes culture, or "civilization," for biology. Blacks
are inferior, not because they are born that way, but because they lack
civilization. This leads D'Souza to a disarmingly simple conclusion. He
contends that "there are three possible explanations" for why "differences"
between blacks and whites "persist at all socio-economic levels": "genes,
culture, and racial discrimination (or some combination of these factors)."8
He then argues that because "liberals"-an undefined group he excoriates
throughout his book-"are committed to the precept that all cultures are or
should be equal, it follows that observable group differences are the product
of either discrimination or genes."' 9 Most of D'Souza's work is aimed at
proving his theory that racial discrimination has never been much of a problem
in the United States and is not now. Having proved the theory to his own
satisfaction, he argues that, "[i]f discrimination cannot fully explain why blacks
do not perform as well as whites on various measures of performance, then the
conclusion cannot be escaped: according to the liberal paradigm, blacks must
be genetically inferior. Arthur Jensen and Charles Murray wait in the
wings."2 ° The way out, of course, is to accept D'Souza's view that black
culture, not black genetic make-up, is defective.
C. Formal Equality
Proponents of the "new racism," unlike their more benighted predecessors,
do not oppose formal racial equality. On the contrary, they often embrace it,
15. Id. at 527.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 529. Other causes come to mind, including the disproportionate number of poor blacks,
the lack of job opportunities in inner cities, a criminal justice system that punishes black youths for
minor crimes more harshly than whites who commit identical crimes, the failure of many urban police
forces to provide meaningful protection for black neighborhoods, the easy access to firearms fostered
by conservative elements in society, a lack of commitment to quality urban education, housing policies,
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arguing that any policies which deviate from formal equality are themselves
racist. Thus they reject any form of affirmative action or other public policies
designed to reach out to minorities traditionally excluded from the American
mainstream. They even reject race-conscious monitoring of equality or equal
opportunity. Because the "new racism" denies the existence of discrimination
in American society, proponents argue there is no need to consider race at any
level of social policy. The result of the "new racism," if implemented, would
be to give lip service to formal equality while allowing individuals, corpora-
tions, and governmental entities to discriminate freely, as long as the
discrimination was undertaken without any formal policy.
Such a social policy is more open and more clever than the de jure
segregation of the pre-Brown era. It would allow some blacks to enter elite
jobs, thereby satisfying proponents of the claim that equality exists. Indeed, the
very existence of a few such people-D'Souza touts Justice Clarence Thomas,
General Colin Powell, and Virginia's former Governor Douglas Wilder-
proves to the proponents of the "new racism" that racial discrimination does
not exist. 21 At the same time, the policies of the "new racism" would allow
for informal discrimination because there could be no monitoring of the failure
of minorities to be integrated into the American mainstream.
II. D'SOUZA'S NON-RACIST AMERICA
D'Souza argues that the process of overcoming racism in American society
"must first involve revising our most basic assumptions about race."' He
notes: "I question and reject the following widely shared premises that shape
the conventional wisdom about racism, as well as America's civil rights
laws."23 Among other things, he rejects the following propositions: "[s]egrega-
tion was a system established by white racists for the purpose of oppressing
blacks;" "[t]he civil rights movement represented a triumph of justice and
enlightenment over the forces of Southern racism and hate;" and "[s]lavery was
a racist institution, and the Constitution's compromise with slavery discredits
the American Founding as racist and morally corrupt." 24
D'Souza concludes that there is no white racism, and except for some
distant period between the end of the Civil War and the modern era, there
never really was any racism, only scattered examples of intolerance. Even the
early twentieth century, when segregation was in full force and lynching was
rampant, was not truly an era of racism because, D'Souza contends,
segregation was a paternalistic system promulgated by the better class of whites
21. See id. at 526.
22. D'SouzA, supra note 3, at 2.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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to protect blacks from the real "racists" in the South.' He even claims that
protests to segregation in the late nineteenth century came not from blacks
offended by discrimination, but from white owners of street cars and other
facilities, who resisted separate accommodations for blacks because it was
economically inefficient to provide them.26 Thus, D'Souza argues, the United
States has never been and is not now a fundamentally racist society. He rejects
the civil rights movement, the movement toward integration, and the value or
need for civil rights law. D'Souza's only black hero is Booker T. Washington,
whom he describes in glowing terms for having "sought reconciliation and
common ground even with Southern segregationists. "27
From such claims D'Souza concludes that racism is not the root of black
unemployment, ghettoization, and what he refers to as "black failure"2 in
America. He rejects the assumptions he ascribes to "liberals," that differences
in black and white success in education and finding jobs are tied to either
racism or social conditions, and concludes "that it is an illusion to believe that
racial difference between blacks and whites is largely a phenomenon of
socioeconomic class."29 Rather, D'Souza's explanation for "black failure,"
including lower IQ scores, "is ... the functional inadequacy of African
American culture. " He believes that this situation is compounded by racists
in the black community, the misguided goals of the civil rights movement,
affirmative action, and of course, his true bite noire (if one can use that term
in an essay on this subject), white liberals. Emphatically he argues that
"[r]acism cannot explain most of the contemporary hardships faced by African
Americans, even if some of them had their historical roots in oppression.""
This acknowledgment of oppression is as much of a concession to history as
he seems willing to make.
Although D'Souza denies that historical forces created our modern racial
dilemmas, he nevertheless focuses a great deal of attention on history, or at
least on past events interpreted through his rather peculiar lens. It is important
for D'Souza to do this because, in order to maintain that black failure rests at
the doorstep of black America, he must slay the dragons of history that suggest
more complicated, widespread, and deeply rooted causes.
In the rest of this Review I will focus on D'Souza's analysis of early
segregation and his peculiar, indeed bizarre, ideas about slavery and racism.
25. Id. at 179-81.
26. See infra Part I. D'Souza writes, "Who fought segregation? Not the liberals: there were few
outspoken liberals in South and the opinions were irrelevant. Rather, it was the private companies such
as streetcar owners who mounted the only significant, albeit unsuccessful opposition." D'SouZA, supra
note 3, at 180.
27. Id., supra note 3, at 185.
28. Id. at 431.
29. Id. at 457.
30. Id. at 461.
31. Id. at 526.
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The analysis he presents of these two subjects lays the groundwork for the rest
of his book. If he is right that slavery was not racist and that segregation was
not harmful to blacks, then perhaps racism is not at the root of our social
problems. But, if he is wrong on these issues-as I argue he is-then much of
the rest of his book must collapse as well.
III. D'SouzA's NEW HISTORY OF SEGREGATION
D'Souza explains segregation as a system created by white conservatives
who wanted to protect blacks from the meaner elements of Southern society.
There is some element of truth to this but, like much in this book, D'Souza
avoids complexity and historical evidence that might undermine his ultra-
conservative views. Moreover, his praise for the Southern white elite is
overblown and often unjustified.
D'Souza claims that white conservatives established segregation to "assure
that blacks, like the handicapped, would be insulated from the radical-racists
and-in the paternalist view-permitted to perform to the capacity of their
arrested development." 32 Conversely, white "radicals had no qualms about
tormenting and killing blacks" while "conservatives were appalled by such
vulgar displays of bloodthirstiness."" Segregation, therefore, came out of
"the code of the Christian and the gentleman." The Southern elite, by denying
blacks equal rights, were actually trying to protect them.34
But the process of creating segregation was too complicated to easily divide
Southern whites into "conservatives" and "radicals." Moreover, Southern
conservatives, even "Christian gentlemen" were willing to use violence to
suppress blacks. After the Civil War, a former Confederate general and
wealthy landowner, Nathan Bedford Forest, became the first grand wizard of
the Ku Klux Klan, a terrorist organization which used violence to prevent
blacks from voting, achieving economic independence, or attaining educa-
tion.35 Throughout the South, community leaders joined the Klan in the 1860s
and 1870s.
After Reconstruction, conservative Southern "gentlemen" used violence to
suppress. black and white political cooperation. In 1892, for example, white
Populists courted the black vote in much of the South. D'Souza's "gentlemen"
supported the Democratic Party.36 In Georgia whites supporting the Demo-
crats murdered at least fifteen black Populists; in Virginia and North Carolina
32. Id. at 179.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Brian S. Wills, Forrest, Nathan Bedford, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE CONFEDERACY 606,
607 (Richard N. Current ed., 1993).
36. See James C. Cobb, Segregating the New South: The Origins andLegacy ofPlessy v. Ferguson,
12 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1017, 1021 (1996).
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the white elite resorted to riots to suppress the black vote.37 In the 1890s
much of the movement to disenfranchise blacks came from the white elite who
controlled the Democratic party. Such opposition was fueled by the fear of a
growing alliance between poor whites and blacks. In Arkansas, when white
Populists denounced lynching, "a Democratic newspaper offered the reassur-
ance that practical Arkansas farmers had not 'suddenly become ... defenders
of Negro rapists and criminals. ' "38 Thus the white elite was willing to support
lynching and crude race baiting to maintain its political power. Surely it is
difficult to see how blacks were "insulated" from white violence, or how
D'Souza can characterize the white elite as protective.
Starting with the end of the Civil War and continuing well into the 1960s,
white conservatives tolerated lynching, race riots, and racial murders in order
to suppress blacks. Between 1889 and 1918, Southern whites lynched about
2900 blacks.39 Some were hanged, others were burned alive. White conserva-
tives often took part in these gory affairs, and rarely if ever condemned
them.40 The only Southern opposition to lynching came from a few dedicated
Southern white liberals, Southern white women progressives, and of course,
the black community.4 The white elite throughout the South rarely discour-
aged, and often encouraged, urban riots against black communities. The
Atlanta Constitution, a voice of the elite new South, constantly belittled blacks,
inflamed passions through hysterical reporting of alleged "[n]egro crime
waves," and encouraged attacks against blacks that led to the bloody Atlanta
race riot of 1906.42 Similarly, in Tulsa the white elite supported the use of
extreme force, including an aerial bombing of a black neighborhood in the race
riot of 1921.43 After the riot, the Mayor and City Commission attempted to
use eminent domain and newly adopted city zoning ordinances to claim land
owned by blacks. Their goal was to force all blacks out of the city and use the
land they had owned to build a new railroad terminal.' Only tenacious
37. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A
HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 257-58 (7th ed., McGraw-Hill 1994).
38. CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 97 (1987)
(quoting ARKANSAS GAZETrE, Sept. 9, 1892, quoted in John W. Graves, Negro Disfranchisement in
Arkansas, 26 ARK. HIST. Q. 212-13 (1967)).
39. See FRANKLIN AND MOSS, supra note 36, 37, at 312; KERMIT L. HALL ET AL., AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY 450 (2d ed. 1996).
40. See generally Charles Crowe, Racial Violence and Social Reform: Origins of the Atlanta Riot
of 1906, reprinted in RACE, LAW AND AMERICAN HISTORY 1700-1990: LYNCHING, RACIAL VIOLENCE,
AND LAW 94-142 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1992) [hereinafter RACE, LAW AND AMERICAN HISTORY];
Charles Crowe, Racial Massacre in Atlanta, September 22, 1906, reprinted in RACE, LAW AND
AMERICAN HISTORY, supra.
41. See Crowe, Racial Violence, supra note 40.
42. See id.
43. See Paul Finkelman, Not Only the Judges' Robes Were Black: African-American Lawyers as
Social Engineers, 47 STAN. L. REV. 161, 184-85 (1994). See generally SCOTT ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN
A PROMISED LAND: THE TULSA RACE RIOT OF 1921 (1982).
44. See Finkelman, supra note 43, at 184-85.
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resistance, led by the black attorney Buck Colbert Franklin, defeated this
attempt to drive blacks from Tulsa.45
These few examples of widespread racism and violence sanctioned by the
white Southern elite suggest a striking deficiency in D'Souza's history of
American segregation. In reality, all classes of whites endorsed and supported
segregation and violence. Irrational race hatred, class warfare, greed, and
economic exploitation went into the matrix of creating a segregated America.
A. Opposition to Segregation
Just as D'Souza does not understand the underpinnings of segregation or
its historical development, neither does he understand the persistence of black
resistance to it. D'Souza writes: "Who fought segregation? Not the liberals:
there were few outspoken liberals in the South and their opinions were
irrelevant. Rather, it was the private companies such as streetcar owners who
mounted the only significant, albeit unsuccessful opposition."' Even if this
analysis is correct-which, as will be clear in a moment, it is not-the
argument that businesses opposed segregation does not explain why white
professional associations, such as county and state bars and medical societies,
refused to accept black members.47 Segregation of professional associations,
which preceded most statutorily required segregation, had no economic basis;
it was purely a racist response by the white elite to the emergence of the
African American professional.
D'Souza bases his analysis on one economic history article which looked
only at streetcar segregation.4" Yet, D'Souza generalizes from this narrow
analysis to assert that "private companies ...mounted the only significant"
opposition to segregation.49 Oddly, D'Souza seems unaware of many black
boycotts of streetcars, even though the very article he cites discusses them.5"
But boycotts were just one way in which blacks fought segregation.
The battle against segregation was also fought in the courts. D'Souza makes
only a passing reference in the text to the fact that, in 1896, "the Supreme
Court upheld the 'separate but equal' doctrine. " " Having failed even to
mention the name of this case, Plessy v. Ferguson,52 in the text, D'Souza does
not bother to examine its roots. Plessy was a test case, brought and paid for by
45. Id.
46. D'SOUZA, supra note 3. at 180.
47. On the problems of early black lawyers, see generally J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION:
THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER 1844-1944 (1994) and Finkelman, supra note 43.
48. Jennifer Roback, The Political Economy of Segregation: The Case of Segregated Streetcars, 46
J. ECON. HIST. 893 (1986).
49. D'SOUZA, supra note 3, at 180.
50. See Roback, supra note 48, at 907, 911, 912; see also August Meier & Elliott Rudwick, The
Boycott Movement Against Jim Crow Streetcars, 1900-1930, at 55 J. AM. HIT. 55 (1969).
51. D'SOUZA. supra note 3, at 178.
52. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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African Americans in New Orleans, not by the railroads, to challenge the
validity of the laws requiring separate railroad cars.53
Plessy was only the most famous of a number of cases brought by blacks
to challenge segregation. In Hall v. DeCuir,54 a black woman challenged the
action of a steamboat that refused to allow her to eat in the stateroom, which
the steamboat operators, in violation of state law, closed to blacks. In 1881,
Mrs. Silena Gray, the wife of a minister from Lexington, Kentucky,
successfully sued the Cincinnati Southern Railroad when the railroad would not
let her sit in the first class car."5 Similarly, Mrs. Belle Smoot sued the
Kentucky Central Railroad for barring her from the ladies coach because of her
race.56 Mrs. Smoot lost her case, perhaps because the Kentucky jury was less
sympathetic to her claim than the one from Ohio had been for Mrs. Gray. But
regional sympathies were not always decisive. In Tennessee, Jane Brown
successfully sued for $3000 when the railroad discriminated against her.57 The
railroad had refused to seat Brown in the "ladies car" 58 and a Tennessee jury
found that this violated common law standards of reasonableness. However, the
Tennessee legislature thought otherwise and, in 1881, passed a law requiring
segregation in first-class accommodations on railroads.59
The push to keep middle-class black men and women from the first-class
and ladies cars on trains came directly from the white elite-D'Souza's
"Christian gentlemen." They wanted to force middle-class black women and
men to ride in the second-class and smoking cars with the rougher, lower-class
white men. Indeed, throughout the twenty to thirty years before southern states
required segregated transportation, railroads and steamboats routinely
segregated blacks by preventing them from sitting in first-class accommodations
even if they paid for them. Instead, the companies forced blacks into second-
class cars, baggage cars, and smoking cars. These were always inferior
facilities. As Booker T. Washington noted: "The seats in the coach given to
colored people are always greatly inferior to those given the whites. The car
is usually very filthy. There is no carpet as in the first class coach."'
Washington also complained that these Jim Crow cars were not even
53. See LOFGREN, supra note 38.
54. 95 U.S. 485 (1878).
55. Gray v. Cincinnati S. R.R., 11 F. 683 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1882); see also Patricia Hagler Minter,
The Failure of Freedom: Class, Gender, and the Evolution of Segregated Transit Law in the Nineteenth-
Century South, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 993 (1995).
56. Smoot v. Kentucky Cent. Ry. Co., 13 F. 337 (C.C.D. Ky. 1882).
57. Brown v. Memphis & Charleston Ry. Co., 5 F. 499 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1880).
58. The ladies car was in fact open to women traveling alone and women traveling with men. It
allowed women to travel in cars where people-men-were smoking, drinking, and acting in a rough
manner unsuitable for ladies in Victorian-era America. See id.
59. Ch. 155, 1881 Tenn. Pub. Acts 211; see also Minter, supra note 55, at 1003.
60. Booker T. Washington, Letter to the Editor, ADVERTISER, Apr. 24, 1885, reprinted in 2
BOOKER T. WASHINGTON PAPERS 270-71, quoted in LOFGREN, supra note 38, at 16.
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exclusively for blacks because, "[w]henever a poorly dressed, slovenly white
man boards the train he is shown into the colored half coach. When a white
man gets drunk or wants to lounge around in an indecent position, he finds his
way into the colored department."61 This evidence shows that, far from
attempting to protect blacks from the hostility of the white lower classes, the
white elite tried to force blacks and lower-class whites to mingle, often under
deplorable conditions.
Along the same lines, the steamboat operators in Hall, in violation of state
law, chose to segregate blacks from the staterooms of the elite.62 Paternalism
cannot explain the actions of the steamboat operators. Nor does it explain the
desire of the Southern elite-before statutory segregation was widespread-to
segregate themselves from educated, refined, middle-class, black professionals
and entrepreneurs. During Reconstruction, railroads and steamboats even
forced black officeholders, including members of Congress, to sit in segregated
facilities or in the integrated "smoking" and second-class cars.63 D'Souza
would like to blame segregation on working-class and lower-class whites. He
wants to interpret segregation as something elite whites created to separate the
violence-prone lower classes from each other in order to prevent the lower
class whites from lynching blacks. But, in fact, segregation was initially used
only to separate professional and middle-class whites from their black
counterparts. The early segregation of blacks on railroads and steamships
involved forcing middle class blacks, who could afford first-class tickets, to sit
with the poorer class of whites who could not afford first-class passage.
History also shows that businesses, rather than opposing segregation,
actually initiated it. In the Tennessee case discussed above, a jury found that
the railroad was acting in an unreasonable manner by segregating the ladies
car.' This demonstrates that, long before the law required segregation,
Southern businesses practiced it by refusing to sell blacks first-class tickets for
public transportation. This was certainly not in their economic self-interest; it
was, however, in the cultural and class interests of the leaders of the South
who controlled these enterprises.
Now that it is clear that it was not D'Souza's "private companies such as
streetcar owners who mounted the only significant, albeit unsuccessful
opposition"' to segregation, we return to his question: "Who fought
segregation?"' In reality, as is hinted above, the most significant opposition
came from blacks.
61. Id.
62. See Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878).
63. For examples of this kind of treatment, see LOFGREN, supra note 38, at 15-16.
64. See Brown v. Memphis & Charleston Ry. Co., 5 F. 499 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1880).
65. D'SouzA, supra note 3, at 180.
66. Id.
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In the antebellum period, Northern blacks challenged segregation through
lawsuits, political action, and cooperative protest with whites. Roberts v.
Boston67 is only the best known struggle against antebellum Northern
segregation. In that case a young black attorney, Robert Morris, represented
black parents seeking to send their children to integrated schools. 6 When the
case got to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Charles Sumner, a white
liberal, argued on behalf of integration. In his brief, Sumner made constitution-
al, policy, and psychological arguments similar to those used later in Brown v.
Board of Education.69 Unlike the attorneys in Brown, however, he was
unsuccessful. In the first use of the "separate but equal doctrine," Chief Justice
Lemuel Shaw upheld Boston's system of segregating black children.70 But
neither Boston's black community nor Sumner gave up after Roberts. Rather,
blacks in Boston redoubled their efforts to eliminate segregated schools. A
boycott "reduced black [school] attendance dramatically.""' Some blacks
relocated, "taking advantage of integrated schools in several towns outside
Boston."72 Meanwhile blacks petitioned the legislature, which in 1855
prohibited segregated schools in Massachusetts.73
As the cases illustrate, in the period immediately before and continuing
after the Civil War, blacks were persistent in their opposition to segregation.
In yet another example of blacks using the courts to attempt to vindicate their
claims of equality, one of The Civil Rights Cases74 was a civil law suit
brought by Sallie Robinson after the Memphis and Charleston Railroad refused
to let her sit in the "ladies car. "" In The Civil Rights Cases, the Court struck
down most of the Civil Rights Act of 1875.76 Blacks throughout the nation
responded to the Court's decision with "shock and profound dismay," holding
protest meetings throughout the country.77 In 1889, black men and women in
Baltimore organized the United Brotherhood of Liberty, which was dedicated
to fighting segregation. This organization arranged for the 1889 publication of
Justice and Jurisprudence: An Inquiry Concerning the Constitutional
Limitations of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, a "philo-
sophic account of the jurisprudence of race-prejudice, and of the history of its
67. Roberts v. Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849).
68. On Morris, see Finkelman, supra note 43, at 174-79.
69. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
70. See Roberts, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 198; JAMES HORTON & LOIS HORTON, BLACK BOSTONIANS
71 (1979); LEONARD W. LEVY & DOUGLAS L. JONES, JIM CROW IN BOSTON: THE ORIGIN OF THE
SEPARATE BUT EQUAL DOCTRINE (1974).
71. HORTON, supra note 70, at 74.
72. Id. at 74-75.
73. See id.; LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH 116 (1957).
74. See 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
75. Robinson v. Memphis & Charleston Ry. Co., 109 U.S. 4, 5 (1883).
76. Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 336 (1875).
77. See Marianne Lado, A Question of Justice: African-American Legal Perspectives on the 1883
Civil Rights Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1123, 1128 (1995).
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lineal descent from the ancestral jurisprudence of slavery." 8 The forty-six
chapter tome dealt with all aspects of civil rights law in the United States, and
it was for years the best and only treatise on civil rights law in the United
States.
Blacks in New Orleans took up the struggle in the 1890s, setting the stage
for Plessy. In September 1891, elite "persons of color" in New Orleans formed
the "Citizens Committee to Test the Constitutionality of the Separate Car
Law. " "' They raised $3,000 for the costs of a test case. Albion Tourgee, the
nation's leading white advocate of black rights-a white "liberal" in D'Souza's
terminology-agreed to take the case without fee.' Tourgee, a former judge,
was a nationally prominent writer most noted for his novel about Reconstruc-
tion, A Fool's Errand.8 In June 1892, Homer A. Plessy intentionally sat in
the white car of a railroad train, in what may have been the nation's first
example of a civil rights activist purposely seeking to be arrested to challenge
segregation.
Who fought segregation? At the cutting edge of opposition were blacks,
mostly in the South, and a few whites who joined them. This continued to be
true throughout the first five decades of the twentieth century, as the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) took the lead
in the black struggle against segregation. D'Souza either does not understand
this history, or has chosen to ignore it because it undercuts his overall attack
on the civil rights movement.
Preoccupied with praising segregation, because it provided "economic
opportunity" for blacks,' D'Souza fails to see what most African Americans
saw: The minimal economic opportunity segregation provided for some blacks
was not worth the humiliation, the lack of true opportunity, or the oppression
of so many more blacks.83 Clearly segregation provided some business for
some black professionals, but the system also meant that the vast majority of
African Americans were denied higher paying jobs in industry and government
and all but a tiny handful of blacks were denied educational opportunities on
par with whites. 4
78. JUSTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE: AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
OF THE THIRTEENTH, FOURTEENTH, AND FIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS 42 (Negro University Press 1969)
(1889), quoted in J. Clay Smith, Justice and Jurisprudence and the Black Lawyer, 69 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1077, 1086-87 (1994); see also Lado, supra note 77.
79. See LOFGREN, supra note 38, at 29-31.
80. See Michael Kent Curtis, Albion Tourgee: Remembering Plessy's Lawyer on the 100th
Anniversary of Plessy v. Ferguson, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 187, 192-93 (1996).
81. See id. at 192.
82. D'SOUZA, supra note 3, at 181.
83. See Joseph Gordon Hylton, The African-American Lawyer, The First Generation: Virginia as
a Case Study, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 107, 114 (1994).
84. See Gil Kujovich, Equal Opportunity in Higher Education and the Black Public College: The
Era of Separate But Equal, 72 MINN. L. REV. 29, 143-52 (1987).
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D'Souza describes the age of segregation (roughly 1880-1954) as a kind of
nirvana for blacks, when "[bilack masons, repairmen, jewelers, tailors and
teachers made a modest living in the Jim Crow world" while "[o]n a larger
scale, building on the self-help and fraternal organizations that free blacks set
up during the antebellum era, blacks developed a flourishing banking, real
estate, and insurance industry."' This pollyanna version of America's past
ignores the fact that black lawyers, physicians, and other professionals were
denied access to their white colleagues, as organizations like the American Bar
Association remained segregated until the 1940s.86 It also ignores the problem
that most blacks had no access to college and professional education because
Southern states refused to provide schools for them. For example, not until the
late 1940s did the Supreme Court begin to force states like Texas and
Oklahoma to provide legal education for blacks.'
D'Souza's history of segregation ignores the grinding poverty of most
Southern blacks (who made up more than 90% of all African Americans), the
police brutality, thousands of lynchings, lack of due process in the courts,
denial of the ballot, and persistent violence that public officials, private
individuals, and terrorist organizations like the Ku Klux Klan constantly
imposed on all Southern and some Northern blacks. Black teachers may have
had jobs in segregated schools, but they were paid less than whites"8 and had
to teach under horrible conditions. Southern school districts uniformly spent far
less on the education of black children than on white children. s9 Many
Southern school districts refused to provide high schools for blacks, because
the elite conservatives-D'Souza's "Christian gentlemen"-who ran the school
boards saw no reason to provide such "higher" education for people they
hoped to keep in a perpetual state of economic and social peonage.9°
Most important of all, D'Souza ignores the persistent opposition to
segregation that blacks mustered whenever they could, even when the chances
of winning were slim and the cost of opposition high. At great expense, and
85. Id. at 181-82.
86. See SMrTH, supra note 47, at 541-45.
87. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (ordering University of Texas Law School to admit
black student); Sipuel v. Oklahoma Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (ordering University of
Oklahoma Law School to admit black students).
88. See, e.g., Alston v. Board of Educ. of Norfolk, 112 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1940) (ordering school
board to pay black teachers same salaries as white teachers).
89. In 1949-50, for example, the School District in Clarendon County, South Carolina spent $179
for each white student in the public schools and $43 for each black student. The total value of the 61
schools for blacks was $194,575 while the 12 schools for whites were valued at $673,850. See RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 8 (1975).
90. See, e.g., Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (denying relief
to blacks in Augusta, Georgia who sought to enjoin the construction of new high school for white
students after School board had abolished county's only high school for blacks); Gebhart v. Belton, 91
A.2d 137 (Del. 1952) (noting that in Delaware there were no high schools for blacks outside of two
major cities), aff'd on other grounds, Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
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often at greater personal risk, blacks challenged segregation whenever they
could. This short history illustrates the fundamental inaccuracy of D'Souza's
assertions that segregation was an attempt by the elite to protect blacks from
the lower classes; that business interests opposed segregation on economic
grounds; and that white businesses, not blacks, were the main opponents of
segregation. More importantly, it demonstrates that segregation was never
benign, but was almost always damaging to the economic, social, and
educational aspirations of blacks. It is the heritage of this pernicious system,
and not the uncivilized nature of black culture, that most immediately created
the racial and social problems that America faces as it enters the twenty-first
century. Lurking in the background of segregation is the legacy of American
slavery and the racism it created.
IV. D'SOUZA's NEW HISTORY OF SLAVERY
D'Souza's mischaracterization of the age of segregation is predicated on his
bizarre description of slavery. He argues that slavery was not a racist
institution. Much of his book rests on this claim. If slavery was not racist, then
D'Souza can claim that American society is not either. But D'Souza's
arguments unravel if our experience with slavery so poisoned us that our
culture might still suffer from the racism it created. Therefore, it is important
to examine seriously his assertions about slavery and race.
D'Souza boldly rejects what he asserts to be the conventional wisdom that
"[s]lavery was a racist institution, and the Constitution's compromise with
slavery discredits the American founding as racist and morally corrupt." 9' In
a series of rhetorical questions, he attempts to create doubt that "American
slavery was a racist institution," that "whites were the oppressors and blacks
were the victims," and that the Constitution was proslavery.1
His response to these and other issues takes the form of a forty-seven page
chapter with the provocative title, "An American Dilemma: Was Slavery a
Racist Institution?"93 The chapter contains 249 footnotes that cover another
seventeen pages at the back of the book. Surely such apparently prodigious
scholarship must impress the serious reader and the nonspecialist alike.
At the outset, it is necessary to separate two points that D'Souza claims are
inaccurate conventional wisdom. The racism of slavery is an entirely separate
issue from the compromises over slavery that were written into the Constitu-
tion. Conventional wisdom surely accepts that slavery was racist. But the claim
that conventional wisdom agrees that the American Founding was "morally
corrupt" is purely a straw man D'Souza creates to knock down. By tying the
91. D'SOUZA, supra note 3, at 2; see also id. at 22.
92. Id. at 70-71.
93. Id. at 67.
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two points together, D'Souza wants to force his readers to accept both or
neither. Since many Americans will not accept the latter point, that the
Founding was morally corrupt, they might very well also reject the former
point, that slavery was racist.
The following Section will first examine the fundamental racism of slavery.
It seems almost perverse to have to make the point, but since D'Souza has
gone to great lengths to deny it, a discussion of race and slavery is in order.
On the second point, this Article will argue that there is indeed great moral
taint associated with slavery and the American Founding. This does not,
however, wholly "discredit" the Founding, although it does force us to see the
ways in which slavery and racism were important components of it.
A. D'Souza's Peculiar History of Race and Slavery
D'Souza begins by asserting that "[a]lthough U.S. Senator Bill Bradley
articulates the conventional view that 'slavery was our original sin,' there was
nothing original about Americans practicing slavery."' This retort, which
seems clever at first glance, is not particularly responsive. Slavery was
certainly not "original" to the English colonies on the mainland of North
America. Nevertheless, simply noting that slavery did not originate in the
American colonies fails to address Senator Bradley's point.
D'Souza believes that because slavery was not unique to the American
colonies, it is not the source of the deplorable state of American race relations.
In a largely accurate, though somewhat polemical discussion of slavery in
various cultures, D'Souza demonstrates, as if anyone doubted it, that slavery
could be found in many places and that in Africa human bondage was
universally common.95 Indeed, he seems to take special delight in reminding
his readers about slavery in Africa, and among Native Americans and Arabs.
He notes that slavery was "practiced in the ancient world" and also that "in the
modem era slavery was prevalent in Africa, the slave trade was actively
promoted by the Arabs, American Indians owned slaves, and there were even
thousands of black slaveowners in America. In this sense, American slavery
was hardly a peculiar institution."'
D'Souza shows that North African Arabs and sub-Saharan black Africans
enslaved black Africans and sold them to each other and to European traders.
These historically accurate observations may offend some extremist Afro-
centric scholars, who would like to blame Christians or Jews for the African
trade and will undoubtedly educate many non-specialists, but they offer no new
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American slavery.
So far, this is nothing spectacular or new. But, in a clever, though not
terribly sophisticated move, D'Souza next tries to argue that slavery was not
racist because (1) Africans had held each other in slavery and sold each other
to Euro-Americans, and (2) in the United States some African Americans
owned slaves who were also African Americans. On both logical and historical
grounds, this argument fails. Neither the fact that Africans sold black slaves,
nor that a handful of blacks in the United States owned slaves, negates the facts
that American slavery was racially-based, that American slaveowners
developed elaborate racist arguments to justify slavery, and that no one but a
person of African ancestry could be a slave in the United States.
B. African Participation in Slavery
That Africans sold other Africans into slavery merely shows that all
Africans did not see each other as being of the same race or ethnic group, or
that when they did, it did not prevent them from enslaving each other. Indeed,
we might argue that it is racist even to presume that all Africans saw
themselves as members of the same race or group. We certainly do not apply
such standards to Europe, where ethnic and religious differences have allowed
people of the same "race" to enslave and slaughter each other. The very word
"slave" originates from the word "slav." The Italians and other Southern
Europeans enslaved so many Slavic peoples that the people and the term
became synonymous.' In the 1940s, Germans enslaved their fellow country-
men (as well as Russians, Poles, and other Europeans). Those sent to German
industries as slaves or sent to German slave labor camps (as opposed to death
camps like Auschwitz) were often physically indistinguishable from those who
commanded their labor. Blond, blue-eyed German-speaking natives of Berlin
or Frankfurt were enslaved by the German government if they were also Jews
or of partial Jewish ancestry. Under German theories of race, those enslaved
were designated as members of different races or as politically corrupted. 9
Thus, it should hardly surprise us that in Africa Egbos sold Yorubas into
slavery, and vice versa. Although he does not say it, D'Souza subtly tries to
imply that Africans caused their own misfortune and that Africa itself was an
uncivilized place, because Africans sold each other into slavery. Curiously, this
begs the important question of the level of civilization of the Europeans who
bought slaves. Indeed, the willingness of Europeans to enslave strangers who
had done no harm to them surely raises moral issues and leads one to question
97. "Mhe Slavonic population in parts of central Europe having been reduced to a servile condition
by conquest; the transferred sense is clearly evidenced in documents of the 9th century." 15 OxFoRD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 665 (2d ed. 1989).
98. See generally Richard Breitman, The 'Final Solution', in MODERN GERMANY RECONSIDERED,
1870-1945, at 197-209 (Gordon Martel ed., 1992) (discussing the treatment of Jews in Nazi Germany).
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what might be meant by "civilization."
D'Souza's discussion of African involvement in the slave trade may impress
readers who know little about world slavery, but anyone acquainted with the
subject realizes that the fact that some Africans enslaved other Africans, and
occasionally even some of their own people, is hardly unique. As Moses
Finley, the great classical scholar, observed, "there were Greek slaves in
Greece, Italian slaves in Rome."' Similarly, there were Arab slaves in the
Middle East, Chinese slaves in China, Russian slaves in Russia, and Indian
slaves on the Indian subcontinent. On the other side of the world, Scandina-
vians enslaved each other." As the sociologist Orlando Patterson has
argued, slavery "has existed from before the dawn of human history right
down to the twentieth century, in the most primitive of human societies and in
the most civilized."101 Patterson found slavery in every "region on earth" and
concluded that "probably there is no group of people whose ancestors were not
at one time slaves or slaveholders."11 Thus, the fact that Africans enslaved
each other only reinforces the generally accepted view that before the
settlement of the Western Hemisphere, slavery was never distinctly racial.
C. Free Black Ownership of Slaves
D'Souza also argues that because some African Americans owned slaves,
slavery in the United States was not racist. In doing so, he vastly overstates the
significance and frequency of black slaveowners. For example, he asserts that
free black slaveowners were "not unusual" in Texas, Florida, and Mississip-
pi. 1°3 But in 1860 there were only a total of 355 free blacks in Texas, 932
in Florida, and 773 in Mississippi."° The overwhelming majority of these
did not own any slaves at all. At the same time, these states had slave
populations of 182,560 (Texas), 61,745 (Florida), and 436,631 (Mississippi),
and white populations of 420,891, 77,747, and 353,899, respectively.105
Rather than saying black slaveowners in these states were not unusual, D'Souza
could more accurately have stated that free blacks, whether they owned slaves
or not, were "unusual."
He also asserts black slaveholding in South Carolina was "fairly com-
mon."' °6 Yet in 1860 only 171 of the 9914 free blacks in the state owned
99. MOSES I. FINLEY, ANCIENT SLAVERY AND MODERN IDEOLOGY 118 (1980).
100. See RUTH MAZO KARRAS, SLAVERY AND SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL SCANDINAVIA (1988); CARL
0. WILLIAMS, THRALDOM IN ANCIENT ICELAND (1937).
101. ORLANDO PATrERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY at vii (1982).
102. Id.
103. D'SOUZA, supra note 3, at 77.
104. See U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN 1860: COMPILED
FROM THE ORIGINAL RETURNS OF THE EIGHTH CENSUS at xii, 594-95 (1864) [hereinafter U.S. BUREAU
OF CENSUS].
105. See id.
106. D'SOuzA, supra note 3, at 77.
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slaves. By comparison, there were 402,406 slaves in the state and 291,300
whites. 10 Again, the more accurate statement would be that free blacks in the
state were unusual, and free black slaveowners incredibly rare.
D'Souza points out that there were "several cases of husbands who bought
their wives to ensure their good behavior." 10s A more accurate portrayal of
black slaveholding would have been the hundreds of cases of blacks who
bought relatives to free them. For example, in New Orleans, "while constitut-
ing only a small fraction of the city's slaveholders," free blacks "filed nearly
one-third of all emancipation petitions. . . . Parents often sacrificed a life's
work and savings to extricate their children from bondage by purchasing them
from a white owner and then holding a pro forma ownership rather than
seeking legal emancipation that could result in forced emigration."1o9
Indeed, most black slaveowners owned just their own relatives. " ° They
often lived in states where it was illegal to manumit slaves, but they had
somehow saved enough money to buy their spouses, children, or parents out
of bondage. As a result, they owned them. A hundred or so free African
Americans, mostly people of mixed ancestry living in the Gulf Coast states or
in South Carolina, owned slaves as investments. Some had inherited slaves
from their white fathers. Others bought them because slaves were a good
investment."' But even where they owned slaves, free blacks faced restric-
tions. In Georgia, for example, free blacks could not buy or sell "their" slaves
and had to rely on a white guardian to administer their estates." 2 Free
blacks, even those who owned slaves, were subject to the same racial
discrimination slaves faced. As the Supreme Court of Georgia noted:
[Tihe act of manumission confers no other right but that of freedom from the
dominion of the master, and the limited liberty of locomotion . . . that the social
and civil degradation, resulting from the taint of blood, adheres to the descendants
of Ham in this country, like the poisoned tunic of Nessus; that nothing but an Act
of the Assembly can purify, by the salt of its grace, the bitter fountain-the
"darkling sea. .113
In 1830 only about 3775 free blacks owned slaves, out of a Southern free
black population of over 180,000."4 By 1860 the number of free blacks in
the South had increased to over 250,000, but the number of black slaveowners
was in decline. In South Carolina, for example, there had been 450 free black
107. See U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, supra note 104, at 594-95.
108. D'SouzA, supra note 3, at 77.
109. Loren Schweninger, Slaveholders, Black, in DICTIONARY OF AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVERY 665,
665 (Randall M. Miller & John David Smith eds., 1988).
110. See FRANKLIN & Moss, supra note 36, 37, at 156-57.
111. See id.
112. See Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 192-94 (1853).
113. Id. at 198.
114. Schweninger, supra note 109, at 665.
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owners in 1830, but there were only 171 in 1860.11
What can we really make of the fact that a handful of free blacks owned
slaves? Not much. The few African Americans who invested in slaves are
merely anomalies, whose existence shows that there were some inconsistencies
in the American South. By the eve of the Civil War, there were strong
movements in the South to force free blacks to leave the region or choose
masters. In Charleston, the large free black community was under tremendous
pressure, and many members of that community were making plans to
leave. 116
D'Souza finds it "morally disturbing that some African Americans owned
black slaves."" 7 Surely all slaveholding is morally disturbing. But only a
minuscule number of African Americans-mostly mulattos of mixed ancestry
trying very hard to distinguish themselves from "blacks"-owned slaves as
investments. D'Souza argues that "free blacks debased their African kinsmen,
sometimes their own relatives, into chattel slavery.""' In fact, of course, all
but a handful of black slaveowners simply tried to make life easier for their
relatives.
Oddly enough, D'Souza misses the far more obvious point that thousands
and thousands of white masters bought and sold their own relatives or kept
them enslaved. Thomas Jefferson, to use a famous example, enslaved his half-
sister-in-law, his half-brothers-in-law, and numerous nieces and nephews who
were either the blood relatives of his wife, himself, or both.' Whether
Jefferson enslaved his own children is open to speculation and remains
115. Id. at 667.
116. Arkansas actually passed a law requiring free blacks to leave. See An Act to Remove the Free
Negroes and Mullatoes from the State, 1858 Ark. Acts 151; see also IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT
MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 372-80 (1974) (discussing harassment of free
blacks in Arkansas). See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE FREE NEGRO IN NORTH CAROLINA (1943) and
No CHARIOT LET DOWN: CHARLESTON'S FREE PEOPLE OF COLOR ON THE EVE OF THE CIVIL WAR
(Michael Johnson & James Roark eds., 1984), for a discussion of other harassment of free blacks in the
South.
117. D'SOUzA, supra note 3, at 79.
118. Id. at 77. Curiously, he does not make similar comments about white masters who held in
bondage or sold their slave children. In fact, he questions the validity of the whole idea that "white
slaveowners produced innumerable illegitimate offspring by raping slave women." Id. at 70-71. It may
be that many master-slave heterosexual relationships did not involve violence or forcible rape. Some
were certainly consensual, and some were based on love. See Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235 (1859)
(involving contest to will that demonstrated love of master for slave to whom he left property); Shaw
v. Brown, 35 Miss. 246 (1858) (describing love of master for mullato children). But, the key fact in
rape is the lack of consent, freely given, and this is legally and morally problematic between a master
and a slave.
119. Sally Hemings and her siblings, all of whom Jefferson owned, were the children of a mulatto
slave and John Wayles, Thomas Jefferson's father-in-law. That made Sally the half-sister of Jefferson's
wife, Martha Wayles Jefferson. The scholars most sympathetic to Jefferson claim that the father of
Sally's children was Jefferson's nephew, Peter Carr, or his brother, Samuel Carr. See JOHN CHESTER
MILLER, THE WOLF BY THE EARS: THOMAS JEFFERSON AND SLAVERY 171 (1977); MERRILL D.
PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION: A BIOGRAPHY 707 (1970). If they are correct,
then the children of Sally Hemings were Jefferson's relatives by blood as well as marriage.
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unprovable by traditional historical methods."2 But, we know that thousands
of white masters had children with their slaves and either sold their offspring
or continued to hold them in bondage. 2 ' That, it seems, is far more "morally
disturbing" than the handful of blacks of mixed ancestry who owned slaves for
profit. 22
Had free blacks owned white slaves, or had whites owned white slaves,
then D'Souza would be on strong ground in arguing that American slavery was
not racist. But that did not happen. From at least the 1670s, whites owned and
controlled black labor; blacks never controlled white labor. 23 It is true that
some whites also controlled white labor, in the form of indentured servants, but
by the 1680s Virginians and other Southerners had begun to make clear that,
while whites would become free at the end of their indenture, blacks were
subject to lifetime servitude that would be passed on to their children.
D. Race and the Distinctiveness of American Slavery
What makes slavery in the New World distinct-peculiar-is that it was
clearly racially-based. The peculiarity is compounded in the United States by
political considerations. Unlike any other nation at the time, the United States
was predicated on the assumption that "all men are created equal." 24 This
forced American masters to defend slavery, usually with racist arguments,
and/or to reject the Declaration of Independence.
Thomas Jefferson, for example, used racist arguments to explain why
blacks could not be emancipated. In the process he helped set the stage for
what would later be called scientific racism. By contrast, Roman masters felt
no need to defend slavery. In Rome, "[i]deological openness was facilitated by
the nakedness of the oppression and exploitation: no 'false consciousness' was
necessary or possible.""' In Rome, there was nothing peculiar about slavery,
120. We do not know whether Jefferson also maintained a sexual relationship with Sally Hemings
and fathered children with her. It is possible that DNA testing of the remains of Sally's children and
Jefferson might provide an answer. See FINKELMAN, supra note 12, at 138, for more on Jefferson and
Sally Hemings.
121. See JOEL WILLIAMSON, NEW PEOPLE: MISCEGENATION AND MULATrOES IN THE UNITED
STATES (1984) (discussing relationships between masters and slaves).
122. D'SouzA, supra note 3, at 79.
123. Indeed, even before Anglo-Americans had established slavery in Virginia, the colony's
legislature prohibited free blacks from owning white indentured servants. An Act of 1670 declared: "noe
negro or Indian though baptised and enjoyned their owne ffredome shall be capable of any such purchase
of christians, but yet not debarred from buying any of their owne nation." Noe Negroes nor Indians to
Buy Christian Servants, Act V. Oct. 1670, in 2 THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF
ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at
280, 281 (William Waller Hening ed., New York, R. & W. & G. Bartow, 1823) [hereinafter HENING'S
VIRGINIA STATUTES].
124. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE preamble (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.").
125. FINLEY, supra note 99, at 117.
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and therefore no need to defend it. In America, slavery was very peculiar, and
thus the master class felt the necessity of defending it at every turn. Racial
difference, which had helped create American slavery in the first place, thus
became the basis of defending slavery after the Declaration of Independence
declared that we are all "created equal."
Historians disagree on the precise moment when slavery emerged in
colonial Virginia. In 1619 the first Africans arrived and were most likely
treated as indentured servants. During the next three decades, Virginia treated
blacks in inconsistent ways. Sometimes they treated blacks exactly the same as
whites. For example, in 1624 a Virginia court allowed a black to testify in a
legal case involving a white."2 But, at other times, Anglo-Virginians singled
out blacks in various ways. In 1642-43, for example, the House of Burgesses
declared that black women would be tithable and thus subject to a tax not
levied on white women. "7
The tithing statute illustrates the way in which race played a major part in
the development of American society less than twenty-five years after the first
blacks arrived in Virginia. It also shows how discrimination against blacks set
the stage for their enslavement. Finally, this act, along with others discussed
in a moment, demonstrates that, at least for British North America, there was
in fact something quite original about racially-based slavery.
By requiring the owners of black female servants to pay a tax on them
equal to the tax they paid on male servants (black or white) 2 8 the tithing
statute encouraged owners of black female servants, and later slaves, to treat
them as field hands, rather than domestic servants. This set the stage in
Virginia for the social notion that black women were fundamentally different
from white women and could be more brutally treated. It is easier to enslave
people if they are first brutalized, and it becomes common to treat them
differently from other people. This is an early and unambiguous example of
how the legal system of the American colonies treated blacks differently from
whites. Whatever the motivation, the result was the development of a racist
legal system, which led to a racially-based system of slavery.
Finally, this statute was the beginning of something original. Enslavement
itself was certainly not original, as D'Souza states and every historian of world
126. In re Sir Henry Maneringe (November 30, 1624), in MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL AND GENERAL
COURT OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA, 1622-1632, 1670-1676, at 33 (H.R. Mc~lwaine ed., 1924) [hereinafter
Mcllwaine], reprinted in PAUL FINKELMAN, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE 10 (1986).
127. Act Concerning Church Government, Act I. Mar. 1642-43. in 1 HENING'S VIRGINIA
STATUTES, supra note 123, at 240, 242. This statute also had the pernicious effect of lowering the status
of blacks within Virginia society. At the time this law was passed interracial marriage was not yet
illegal. Thus, the 1643 law led to the bizarre outcome that Francis Skiper, a white Virginian, had to pay
a tax for his black wife Ann. He would not have had to pay a similar tax for a white wife. See EDMUND
S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 334
(1975).
128. Act Concerning Church Government, supra note 127.
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slavery knows. Nor was the enslavement of blacks in the New World unique
to the British colonies. That had been going on since the early sixteenth
century. The Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and French were all deeply involved
in African slavery long before the British established their first settlement in
Virginia.' 29 But, for English people, discrimination on the basis of race was
original. The 1642 law was certainly an innovation in English, or Anglo-
American, law because women were never tithable under English law.
In 1662, the Virginia House of Burgesses passed another law that created
a major distinction based on race, which was original in terms of English law,
and led directly to slavery. The law was entitled: "Negro womens children to
serve according to the condition of the mother."110 Its preamble noted that
"some doubts have arrisen whether children got by any Englishman upon a
negro woman should be slave or ffree."13 The obvious answer, according
to well-accepted notions of English common law, was that a child, even a
bastard, took the status of the father. 32 But a growing population of free
mulatto children was more than the tobacco barons of Virginia could stand.
Thus, the 1662 law declared that "all children borne in this country shalbe held
bond or free only according to the condition of the mother."' 33 This was a
dramatic break with the common law that was forced by race.'34 Race also
drove the Burgesses to create enhanced punishments for interracial sex and
ultimately to prohibit interracial marriage. Thus, the 1662 law doubled the fine
of any "christian [who] shall committ fornication with a negro man or
woman."135 Just as "Negro" became synonymous with slave, "christian" in
this context applied only to whites. These laws were new to English common
law and were truly innovations both because they recognized race-something
English law had never done-and because they contravened traditional notions
of gender roles, inheritance of status, and the fundamental rights and well-
known liberties of Englishmen.
Virginia's early leaders used the courts, in addition to the statutes, to create
racially-based slavery. A significant example of this came in 1640, when three
servants indentured to one Hugh Gwyn escaped to Maryland. After much
expense and inconvenience, Gwyn brought them back to Virginia, where the
General Court ordered them punished. The two white servants, "Victor a
129. See NORMAN DAVIES, EUROPE: A HISTORY 452-53 (1996) (discussing beginnings of European
involvement in African slave trade in 1441).
130. Act XII, Dec. 1662, in 2 HENING'S VIRGINIA STATUTES, supra note 123, at 170.
131. Id.
132. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & F. Michael Higginbotham, 'Yearning to Breathe Free":
Legal Barriers Against and Options in Favor of Liberty in Antebellum Wirginia, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1213, 1243 n.164 (1993)
133. Id.
134. For more discussion of these laws and statutes in other states, see Paul Finkelman, The Crime
of Color, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2063 (1993).
135. Id.
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dutchman, and the other a Scotchman called James Gregory" 136 were
whipped and sentenced to serve their master for one extra year and then work
for the colony for three more years.137 The court record for the third
runaway is worth quoting in full: "and that the third being a negro named John
Punch shall serve his said master or his assigns for the time of his natural Life
here or elsewhere. "38
This court order illustrates the way in which Anglo-American slavery was
a racial institution from the beginning. Victor and James Gregory were not
Englishmen. Had white Englishmen in Virginia been interested in enslaving
other Europeans, this case afforded them the opportunity to do so. But, despite
the non-English status of the two white defendants, they did not. Only the
"negro named John Punch" received this punishment. This makes sense
because, with the exception of the occasional enslavement of Indians, which
did not last past mid-century, only Africans and their descendants were subject
to enslavement in British North America. There is no record that any person
classified as white was ever sentenced to lifetime enslavement by an Anglo-
American court. 139
The English in Virginia stumbled into slavery, without any careful thought
or consideration of what they were really doing."4 They came without any
experience with bondage and for the first few years treated blacks more or less
like other non-English people. Most blacks in Virginia before 1650 were
136. Mellwaine, supra note 126, at 466 (June 4, 1640 and July 9, 1640).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. It is worth noting that throughout the United States there were many slaves with substantial
amounts of white ancestry, but they were not classified as white. Unlike most other New World
slaveholding jurisdictions, the United States and its predecessor colonies made no distinctions between
people of full and partial African ancestry. The one exception to this was Louisiana, with its French and
Spanish heritage. Thus a Louisiana Court could write:
We do not think there could be any serious denial of the fact that in Louisiana the words
'mulatto,' 'quadroon,' and 'octoroon' are of as definite meaning as the word 'man' or 'child,'
and that, among educated people at least, they are as well and widely known. There is also
the less widely known word 'griff,' which, in this state, has a definite meaning, indicating the
issue of negro and a mulatto. The person too black to be a mulatto and too pale in color to
be a negro is a griff. The person too dark to be a white, and too bright to be a griff, is a
mulatto. The quadroon is distinctly whiter than the mulatto.
State v. Treadway, 52 So. 500, 508 (La. 1910). However, even that court noted:
Nor can there be, we think, any serious denial of the fact that in Louisiana, and, indeed,
throughout the United States (except on the Pacific slope), the word 'colored,' when applied
to race, has the definite and well-known meaning of a person having negro blood in his veins.
We think, also, that any candid mind must admit that the word 'negro' of itself, unqualified,
does not necessarily include within its meaning persons possessed of only an admixture of
negro blood; notably those whose admixture is so slight that in their case even an expert
cannot be positive.
Id.; see also Raymond T. Diamond & Robert J. Cottrol, Codifying Caste: Louisiana's Racial
Classification Scheme and the Fourteenth Amendment, 29 Loy. L. REV. 281 (1983).
140. On the legality of implementing a system of racialized slavery, in the face of contrary English
common law, see Jonathan A. Bush, The British Constitution and the Creation of American Slavery, in
SLAVERY AND THE LAW 379-417 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1997).
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indentured servants or, as they served out their time, former servants.
However, by the 1640s Virginians had begun to make clear distinctions
between whites and blacks. Punishments for blacks were harsher, and in at
least one case a black runaway servant was sentenced to lifetime slavery.
41
While scholars dispute what racial ideas the English brought with them,'
42
it is clear that by the 1640s the English in Virginia had come to see the African
as different and, more importantly, as enslaveable. Quite clearly, the English
never thought other Europeans-other whites-could be enslaved. By the 1660s
Virginians had established race-based slavery. After that, the House of
Burgesses and the General Court began to use "slave," "African," and
"Negro" as almost interchangeable terms. Race became the driving force in
slavery, and naturally enough, slavery became a racist institution.
This history demonstrates that slavery was racial from the beginning. With
the exception of a very small number of Native Americans, 43 only one group
of people in America-Africans-were enslaved. Was slavery racist? It is hard
to come up with another term to describe what happened in early America.
During the next two centuries, slave status was always limited to people of
African ancestry. Throughout their legal codes, court cases, and political
discussions, Southerners used the terms "black," "Negro," and "slave" almost
interchangeably. Illustrative of this was the statement of South Carolina's
Pierce Butler at the Constitutional Convention during a debate over counting
slaves for purposes of representation. Butler declared: "The security the
Southern States want is that their negroes may not be taken from them which
some gentlemen within or without doors, have a very good mind to do.""'
Butler did not make a distinction between "slaves" and "negroes." He, like
most other Americans (at least in the South), used the terms interchangeably.
E. Slavery, the Constitution, and D'Souza's Constitutional History
Butler's brief speech leads to a consideration of the relationship between
slavery and the American Founding, as embodied by the Constitution. D'Souza
rejects what he believes to be conventional wisdom-that is, that the Constitu-
tion was proslavery. He challenges the idea that "the Constitution's compro-
mise with slavery discredits the American founding as racist and morally
corrupt"4 5 and asks, "[m]ust we agree with the abolitionist William Lloyd
141. See Mcllwaine, supra note 126, at 466.
142. Compare WINTHROP JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK (1968) (arguing that English came
predisposed to see blacks as inferior) with MORGAN, supra note 127 (arguing against this position).
143. For a variety of reasons, the enslavement of Indians never worked in the British mainland
colonies. However, the enslavement of Indians underscores the racial aspect of Anglo-American slavery;
like Africans, Indians were not white.
144. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 605 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1966) [hereinafter RECORDS].
145. D'SoUZA, supra note 3, at 2.
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Garrison who charged that far from being a beacon for the world, the
American founding was 'a covenant with death,' an 'agreement in hell,' and
a 'refuge of lies,' an appraisal endorsed by the great black leader Frederick
Douglass?""6
This is, in part, a straw man because in the nineteenth century few
Americans accepted the Garrisonian view of the Constitution as a proslavery
compact. Even Frederick Douglass eventually rejected the Garrisonian
interpretation of the Constitution. Furthermore, many, perhaps most, modem
scholars reject this view of the Constitution. It is also a straw man because
D'Souza implies that all people who accept the proslavery analysis of the
Constitution necessarily accept the argument that the Founding was "morally
corrupt." It is entirely possible to accept the idea that the Constitution was pro-
slavery, even to see immorality or moral ambiguity in the Founding, without
requiring a wholesale denunciation of the era. Most sophisticated scholars do
not seek to make lofty pronouncements about the immorality of the Founding;
rather, they try to explain and understand it.' 47 This requires that we fully
analyze and explore the many proslavery aspects of the Constitution without
apologizing for the actions of the Founders.
D'Souza argues that it would have been impossible to end slavery at the
Convention. He is on firm ground in asserting that "[i]n practical terms as
well, the choice facing the men gathering in Philadelphia was not to permit or
to prohibit slavery. . . . Any suggestion that Southern states could be
persuaded to join a union and give up slavery can be dismissed as unlike-
ly. " 14 This is entirely true. But, as presented by D'Souza, it is another straw
man because he implies that he is arguing against conventional wisdom. In
reality, no serious scholar suggests that ending slavery was possible at the
Philadelphia Convention.
That said, it is important to ask harder questions, which D'Souza refuses
to do. If the framers could not end slavery, what could they have done? And
what did they do about putting slavery, to use Lincoln's language, "in course
of ultimate extinction?"' 4 9 They might have done a great deal to limit the
power of slavery and to favor freedom; in fact, they did almost nothing to
harm slavery but did a great deal to protect and preserve the institution,
ensuring that there would be no constitutional way ever to touch it. 50 It is
146. Id. at 71.
147. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA, 1760-1848 (1977) [hereinafter WIECEK, SOURCES].
148. Id. at 109.
149. A House Divided, Speech at Springfield, 111. (June 6, 1858), in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 461 (Roy P. Bassler ed., 1953).
150. Ratification of a Constitutional amendment requires three-fourths of all the states to vote in
favor of the amendment. U.S. CONSr. amend. V. In 1860, there were 15 slaves states. Had they not
attempted to leave the Union, the slave states could have perpetually prevented a constitutional
amendment ending slavery. To this day-in a 50-state Union-it only takes 13 states to block a
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no wonder that the most proslavery delegates were gleeful about the Constitu-
tion. In trying to convince his fellow South Carolinians to endorse the
Constitution, General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina crowed
to his state's House of Representatives:
We have a security that the general government can never emancipate them, for no
such authority is granted; and it is admitted, on all hands, that the general
government has no powers but what are expressly granted by the Constitution, and
that all rights not expressed were reserved by the several states.,',
D'Souza's discussion of slavery and the Constitution is particularly odd
because he seems to have ignored the relevant scholarship on the issue. My
point is not that he has missed a few articles here and there; rather, he has
ignored major books and articles, available in any university or law library as
well as many public libraries. A number of scholars have written careful and
thoughtful analyses of the Constitutional Convention's relationship to slavery.
All these scholars have demonstrated the important connections between slavery
and the adoption of the Constitution. Yet D'Souza, in his 249 footnotes, has
managed to overlook all of these works.'
This literature undermines D'Souza's arguments in a number of ways.
Despite disagreements, most of these scholars recognize that slavery was a
central issue at the Constitutional Convention, about which the framers
constantly debated. Even conservative politicians, like William Bradford
Reynolds and Reagan cabinet member Donald Hodel, concede that the
Constitution protected slavery.153  Because "conservative" and "liberal"
(whatever those terms might mean) scholars agree on this, D'Souza is hard
pressed to find anyone who thinks otherwise. Few, if any, of the scholars who
have written on slavery and the Founding, however, argue that the compromis-
constitutional amendment.
151. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 286 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1881) [hereinafter ELLIOT, DEBATES].
152. For example he ignores the most important book yet written on the relationship between
slavery and the new nation, DONALD L. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN
POLITICS, 1765-1820 (1971). He also ignores the essential literature demonstrating the connection
between slavery and the Constitution, including ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1974); DON. E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTr CASE (1978); PAUL
FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY (1981); WILLIAM W.
FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS AT BAY, 1776-1854 (1990); STAUGHTON LYND,
CLASS CONFLICT, SLAVERY, AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1967); WIECEK, SOURCES, supra
note 152; Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Constitutional Convention: Making a Covenant With Death,
in BEYOND CONFEDERATION (Richard Beeman et al., eds., 1987), rewritten and revised as chapter 1
of FINKELMAN, supra note 12; William M. Wiecek, Slavery and Abolition Before the United States
Supreme Court 1820-1860, 65 J. AM. HIST. 34 (1978). All of this literature seriously undermines his
contentions about slavery and the Constitution. Oddly, D'Souza even ignores scholarship that might have
supported his position, like DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND SLAVERY
(1984), and William W. Freehling, The Founding Fathers and Slavery: 77 AM. HIST. REV. 77 (1972).
153. See Raymond T. Diamond, No Call to Glory: Thurgood Marshall's Thesis On the Intent of
a Pro-Slavery Constitution, 42 VAND. L. REV. 93, 98-99 (1989).
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es over slavery "discredit the American founding" or make it morally corrupt,
although many point out the moral ambiguities created by slavery. Most
historians looking at this issue rarely cast blame at all. Rather, scholars have
offered critiques of the Founding that demonstrate the importance of slavery
to the making of the Constitution and have suggested that this affected public
policy then, and may do so today. 5 4 Rather than seeking to condemn the
Constitution or the entire Founding, most scholars writing on these subjects
have stressed its moral ambiguity.
D'Souza's dubious analysis of the Constitution and slavery stems from three
problems. First, he does not see or admit that the Constitution did in fact
protect slavery. Second, he distorts the record of the framers themselves. He
asserts that they did not want to protect slavery in the document, but did so
because of popular prejudice, which he erroneously argues, they did not share.
Finally, he vastly overstates the antislavery views of his favorite founder,
Thomas Jefferson, who was not at the Convention but has become the symbol
of the Founding.
1. The Proslavery Constitution
William Lloyd Garrison, the great nineteenth-century abolitionist,
denounced the Constitution as a "covenant with death" and "an agreement with
Hell."' 55 Was this correct? Or is D'Souza correct that the proslavery
provisions of the Constitution represent a compromise "between anti-slavery
and popular consent?"' 56 Or is the real answer something different?
If D'Souza is correct, then the delegates at Philadelphia must have been
more opposed to slavery than the national population. This is not the place to
recapitulate a detailed analysis of the Constitutional Convention and slav-
ery,'57 however, a brief examination of a few aspects of the Convention
illustrates that D'Souza has it backwards.
Throughout the Convention, the delegates from New England and
Pennsylvania fought to give Congress power to regulate commerce by a simple
majority.' s Most Southern delegates (George Washington and James
Madison are the two big exceptions) opposed this. At the same time, the
delegates from South Carolina and Georgia demanded that the Constitution
protect the African slave trade from congressional interference. 15 Almost all
the other delegates agreed that the African slave trade was fundamentally
154.See WIECEK, SOURCES, supra note 152, at 62-83, 249-75; James Oakes, "The Compromising
Expedient": Justifying a Proslavery Constitution, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2023 (1996).
155. FINKELMAN, supra note 12, at 1.
156. D'SOuzA, supra note 3, at 109.
157. See generally, FINKELMAN, supra note 12, at 1-33.
158. See Diamond, supra note 153, at 114-21.
159. See id. at 114-15.
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immoral."6 Even committed slaveowners made a careful distinction between
continuing slavery and importing new slaves from Africa. 6" A majority of
the state delegations, led by Virginia, could have easily defeated the motion to
protect the slave trade from congressional interference.
Near the end of the Convention, however, the New England states backed
South Carolina's demands for explicit protection of the African slave trade in
the Constitution. 62 In return, the South Carolina delegation voted with New
England on the Commerce Clause.' 63 During the debate over the Commerce
Clause, Pierce Butler of South Carolina declared that the interests of the South
and New England were "as different as the interests of Russia and Turkey."
Nevertheless, he was "desirous of conciliating the affections of the East" and
so he supported the Commerce Clause."6 Similarly, General Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney agreed that "it was the true interest of the S. States to
have no regulation of commerce." But in one of the most revealing statements
of the Convention, he explained his support for a clause requiring only a
simple majority for passage of commercial legislation arose because of "their
[the New England states'] liberal conduct towards the views of South
Carolina." The "views of South Carolina" concerned the slave trade. In the
margins of his notes, James Madison made this clear. He wrote that Pinckney
meant the permission to import slaves. An understanding on the two subjects of
navigation and slavery, had taken place between those parts of the Union, which
explains the vote on the Motion depending, as well as the language of General
Pinckney and others.l"
It is impossible to reconcile this debate with D'Souza's far-fetched notion
that the antislavery delegates at the Convention were constrained by their pro-
slavery constituents to protect slavery. On the contrary, when the northern
delegates returned home to campaign for ratification of the Constitution, they
deliberately misled their constituents on what the slave trade provision meant.
Pennsylvania's James Wilson, for example, who surely knew better, tried to
convince the Pennsylvania ratifying convention that the slave trade clause
would allow Congress to end all slavery in the United States. Wilson argued
that after "the lapse of a few years, . . . Congress will have power to
exterminate Slavery within our borders." '6
During the ratification controversy, the slave trade clause was one of the
160. See id. at 116-18.
161. For a discussion of this difference, see Peter Wallenstein, Flawed Keepers of the Flame: The
Interpreters of George Mason, 102 VA MAG. OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 229, at 253 (1994).
162. See Diamond, supra note 153, at 114-21.
163. See id.
164. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 144, at 451-53.
165. Id. at 449-52.
166. 2 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 151, at 484.
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most debated provisions of the Constitution in all of the states north of the
Carolinas. Even some Southerners were appalled that the great men in
Philadelphia had committed the United States to protecting the African slave
trade for at least twenty years. 67 In Virginia, "Republicus" sarcastically
commented that the slave trade provision was "an excellent clause .. , in an
Algerian Constitution" but thought it less well suited to a free Republic."
In New York (where slavery was legal and would remain so until 1799), "A
Countryman from Dutchess County" thought that Americans might become "a
happy and respectable people" if the Constitution were "corrected by a
substantial bill of rights" and, among other changes, the states were forced into
"relinquishing every idea of drenching the bowels of Africa in gore, for the
sake of enslaving its free-born innocent inhabitants. "169 Similarly, in New
Hampshire, which had already abolished slavery, Joshua Atherton claimed no
desire to force the South to end slavery, but he did object to protecting the
slave trade: "There is a great distinction in not taking a part in the most
barbarous violation of the sacred laws of God and humanity, and our becoming
guaranties for its exercise for a term of years."170
Was the slave trade provision a betrayal of the ideals of the Revolution?
James Madison, who valiantly and unsuccessfully opposed this clause,
complained that it was "dishonorable to the National character" and to the
Constitution and that the "twenty years will produce all the mischief that can
be apprehended from the liberty to import slaves."' 7' Of course, Madison
was right. In the period that the trade remained legal, South Carolina imported
more than 80,000 new slaves. Anyone who argues that this does not taint the
American Founding has a truly peculiar, indeed perverse, sense of morality.
Shortly after the Convention agreed to the Slave Trade Clause and the
Commerce Clause, Pierce Butler proposed a fugitive slave provision. The
Convention accepted this addition without a formal vote or any debate.
Moreover, the northern delegates failed to ask for any quid pro quo from the
Southerners. The clause guaranteed that fugitives would be "delivered up" on
claim of their owners. It provided no due process to protect against mistaken
167. One of the common misunderstandings of the Constitution is that the slave trade provision -
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1-guaranteed an end to the trade in 20 years. It did not. It only prohibited
Congress from ending the trade until 1808. Most people at the Convention expected the South,
especially the deep South, to grow more rapidly than the North. Had this in fact occurred, it is
conceivable that there would have been enough support in Congress for the trade to block any bill
banning it.
168. Essays by Republicus (Essay of Mar. 1, 1788), in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 169
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
169. Letters from a Countryman from Dutchess County (letter of Jan. 22, 1788), in 6 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 168, at 62.
170. Fragment of Debate at New Hampshire Convention, in 2 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 151,
at 203-04.
171. 2 FARRAND, REcoRDs, supra note 144, at 414-15.
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identity. Eventually the Supreme Court would interpret this clause to mean that
the federal government was obligated to help masters recover fugitives, that the
masters could do so without any process or procedure whatsoever, and that any
interposition by the states to prevent the kidnapping of free blacks was
unconstitutional.172 This provision was a great victory for the South, gained
at no cost at all.
The proslavery delegates helped shape a Constitution with more than a
dozen clauses that protected slavery.'73 Conversely, nothing in the Constitu-
tion threatened slavery or protected free blacks. Summing up the entire
Convention, General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, who had been one of the
ablest defenders of slavery at the Convention, proudly told the South Carolina
House of Representatives: "In short, considering all circumstances, we have
made the best terms for the security of this species of property it was in our
power to make. We would have made better if we could; but on the whole, I
do not think them bad."174 It is hard to disagree with Pinckney.
2. Democracy and Antislavery
D'Souza's oddest argument is that an abolition of slavery, or presumably
any constitutional provisions that undermined the institution, would have been
undemocratic. He writes: "The dilemma of Jefferson and the American
founders may be summarized as follows: they fully recognized that a
democratic society depends not just on wisdom, but also on consent."' 75 He
then goes on to argue that, "[t]o outlaw slavery without the consent of the
majority of whites would be to destroy democracy, and thus to destroy the very
basis for outlawing slavery."' 76
Given notions of federalism in the 1780s, any national abolition would have
been doomed. To even raise this is to offer up yet another straw man. But the
idea that the Convention might have been less deferential to slavery, that it
might not have protected the African trade, or not adopted a fugitive slave
provision, is hardly far-fetched. Thus it is worth considering, as best we can,
what the public might have supported.
It is hard to understand the basis of D'Souza's claim that a voting majority
in the nation favored slavery. During the Revolution, Pennsylvania passed a
gradual emancipation statute, and New Hampshire and Massachusetts banned
slavery outright, as did the settlers in what became the fourteenth state,
Vermont. A year after the Revolution ended, Connecticut and Rhode Island
172. See Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice
Joseph Story's Judicial Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247.
173. See FInKELMAN, supra note 12, at 3-7.
174. 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 151, at 286.
175. D'SouzA, supra note 3, at 108.
176. Id. at 109.
Yale Law & Policy Review
also passed gradual emancipation statutes. In 1782, Virginia adopted a law
allowing for masters to free their slaves voluntarily.'" In the next three
decades, the free black population in that state grew from 2000 to 30,000 as
hundreds, if not thousands, of masters voluntarily manumitted their slaves.
Meanwhile, in Maryland and Delaware, thousands of slaves gained their
freedom. Even in the Carolinas there was a noticeable, albeit brief, increase
in private manumission. Indeed, in the era following the Revolution, because
of private manumissions, free blacks made up the fastest growing segment of
the Southern population. 178
Given this history, which D'Souza ignores, it is quite likely that in the
1780s a majority in the nation would have supported some form of gradual
emancipation. Surely a majority of the whites in Georgia, the Carolinas,
Virginia, and perhaps Maryland, would have opposed such a law, but the
opposition would not have been unanimous, especially north of South Carolina.
The much larger free populations in the North might very well have out-voted
the South on a straight popular vote. This does not mean that a national
emancipation was politically possible. Surely any attempt to end slavery at the
national level would have destroyed the nation. But, it does suggest that
concern for "democratic," as opposed to federalist, values did not mean the
Constitutional Convention had to give in to the demands of the Deep South for
a continuation of the slave trade or for the fugitive slave clause.
It is not entirely clear what D'Souza has in mind when he talks about
"democracy." The very terms of his own presentation are themselves
questionable. Why limit the vote to the "consent of the majority of
whites?"' 79 Were free blacks not part of the polity? They could vote in much
of the North, as well as in North Carolina. D'Souza presumably thinks their
votes did not count. Moreover, D'Souza somehow thinks that democracy can
exist when large portions of the population are completely voiceless." 8
D'Souza would have us reject the argument that the American Founding was
177. An Act to Authorize the Manumission of Slaves, ch. 61, May 1782, in 11 HENING'S VIRGINIA
STATUTES, supra note 123, at 35.
178. The Virginia jurist St. George Tucker estimated there were 2000 free blacks in Virginia in
1782, when the state legalized private manumission. Virginia's 200 percent increase in free blacks from
1790 until 1810 far outstripped the growth rate of slaves or whites. Similar growth rates occurred in
other states. In Maryland free blacks grew to one quarter of the entire black population in this period.
By 1810 free blacks outnumbered slaves in Delaware. Manumissions continued in Virginia in large
numbers until at least 1805. This percentage growth in free blacks nationally occurred despite the fact
that South Carolina imported more than 80,000 new African slaves between 1803 and 1808. See IRA
BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 46-50 (1974).
179. D'SOUZA, supra note 3, at 109.
180. This raises questions about gender as well as race. There was, however, a major difference.
Most whites-especially men-of the Founding era argued that male voters represented the interests of
their wives, daughters, mothers, and sisters. The extent to which this was true varied. No one, however,
argued that when slaveowners voted they represented the interests of their slaves. Moreover, even if one
accepts the reality (rather than the legitimacy) of only male suffrage, one might ask, can there be a
democracy if between thirty and fifty-five percent of the adult males can never vote?
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"morally corrupt" on grounds that it would have been undemocratic to end
slavery. He makes this argument, however, without ever considering that
slavery itself was so undemocratic as to corrupt notions of democracy. In
Virginia, about one-third the population was black; in South Carolina, a
majority of the inhabitants were black.' 1 D'Souza talks of democracy at the
Founding, but one wonders what he means by it.
Equally odd is D'Souza's contention that the Founders, especially Thomas
Jefferson, favored an end to slavery but were stopped by the Democratic
majority, which favored continuing the peculiar institution. He paints Jefferson
as some sort of proto-abolitionist who "vehemently denounced slavery""82
and "expressed his hope that black accomplishment might prove his suspicions
[on black inferiority] wrong." I83 Like his discussion of slavery and the
Constitution, D'Souza ignores the most important literature about Jefferson and
slavery." 4 Again, he does not simply miss an article here and there. Rather,
D'Souza has chosen not to cite or confront a vast literature that challenges his
unsophisticated approach to Jefferson.
3. Jefferson, Democracy, and Antislavery
Much of D'Souza's book rests on his few brief references to Thomas
Jefferson and his assertions, based on very slim evidence, that Jefferson hated
slavery and wanted to find proof of racial equality. If the most revered of the
Founders was not a racist, and indeed hated racism and slavery, D'Souza
contends, then America might not be such a racist place. On the other hand,
if it turns out that the primary author of the Declaration of Independence was
a racist, who never truly opposed slavery and was thoroughly committed to
white supremacy, then D'Souza's book is built on historical quicksand.
Therefore, a brief examination of Jefferson is in order."M
181. See DONALD B. DODD, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: TWO CENTURIES
OF THE CENSUS, 1790-1990, at 81, 93 (1993).
182. D'SOUzA, supra note 3, at 107.
183. Id. at 108.
184. Particularly odd is his failure to consult the essays in JEFFERSONIAN LEGACIES (Peter S. Onuf
ed., 1993) including my own discussion of Jefferson and slavery, Paul Finkelman, Jefferson and
Slavery: 'Treason Against the Hopes of the World,'in id. at 181. D'Souza similarly fails to consider any
of the arguments in DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION
1770-1823 (1975); DAVID BRION DAVIS, WAS THOMAS JEFFERSON AN AUTHENTIC ENEMY OF
SLAVERY? AN INAUGURAL LECTURE DELIVERED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD ON 18
FEBRUARY 1970 (1970); WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATrTUDES TOWARD
THE NEGRO, 1550-1812 (1968); ROBERT MCCOLLEY, SLAVERY AND JEFFERSONIAN VIRGINIA (1964);
JOHN CHESTER MILLER, THE WOLF BY THE EARS: THOMAS JEFFERSON AND SLAVERY (1977); William
Cohen, Thomas Jefferson and the Problem of Slavery, 56 J. AM. HIST. 503 (1969-70); Paul Finkelman,
Thomas Jefferson andAntislavery: The Myth Goes On, 102 VA. MAO. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 193 (1994);
Garry Wills, The Aesthete, 40 N. Y. REV. BOOKS 6 (1993). Revised versions of my work on Jefferson
appeared in FINKELMAN, supra note 12.
185. For a more elaborate discussion of Jefferson's profound racism and his lifetime support for
slavery, see FINKELMAN, supra note 12, at chs. 5-6.
Yale Law & Policy Review
Shortly after he signed the Declaration, Jefferson left the national Congress
to serve in the Virginia legislature. He remained there until June 1779, when
he became Governor. Jefferson's legislative career was one of the most
satisfying and creative periods in his life. Early on he proposed a bill for a
complete overhaul of Virginia's laws. As chair of the revision committee
Jefferson was able "to set forth in due course a long-range program emphasiz-
ing humane criminal laws, complete religious freedom, and the diffusion of
education, and thus to appear on the page of history as a major prophet of
intellectual liberty and human enlightenment." I86 During and after Jefferson's
service in the legislature, Virginia adopted many of the committee's proposed
laws, including bills on religious freedom, the abolition of primogeniture and
entail, education, citizenship, and the criminal code. More than two centuries
later these still stand out, "and the credit for all of these belongs to [Jeffer-
son]. 
" 187
As chair of the committee to revise Virginia's laws, Jefferson was in the
ideal position to work towards gradual emancipation. But he failed to take the
lead. And when legislators approached Jefferson with draft legislation that
would have brought gradual emancipation to Virginia, he declined to add it to
the proposed revisions. He later explained it was "better that this should be
kept back" and only offered as an amendment,' although it is unclear why
this would have been a better strategy. Jefferson's strategy in fact killed the
proposal, which was probably his intention all along. Jefferson never again
proposed ending slavery in Virginia or the United States. He consistently
refused to challenge slavery and, even after he left the presidency, refused to
endorse gradual emancipation.
This history suggests that D'Souza is simply wrong in arguing that concern
for democracy led the Founders, especially Jefferson, to refuse to take a stand
against slavery. Although there certainly could have been no national
emancipation, there are many concessions to slavery in the Constitution that
might have been avoided. Even so, at the state level much was possible. But,
in a democratically elected legislature Jefferson refused to allow a debate over
slavery. In 1782, when he was temporarily out of political office, the Virginia
legislature passed a law allowing for voluntary manumission of slaves. This
suggests some popular support for hindering slavery, even in Virginia.
D'Souza's notion that Jefferson "expressed his hope that black accomplish-
ment might prove his suspicions" on the racial inferiority of blacks "wrong"
also does not hold up to careful scrutiny.8 9 D'Souza was quoting a famous
186. DUMAS MALONE, 1 JEFFERSON AND HIS TIMES 247-63 (1948).
187. Id.
188. MERRILL D. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION 153 (1970) (quoting
Thomas Jefferson).
189. D'SOuzA, supra note 3, at 108.
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letter Jefferson wrote to Bishop Henri Grdgoire of Paris, when the Bishop sent
Jefferson his volume Literature of Negroes.190 The Bishop had written this
book to prove the equality of blacks. On the same point, D'Souza quotes, in
a footnote, Jefferson's famous letter to Benjamin Banneker, who sent Jefferson
a draft of his almanac."' In a perfunctory, one-paragraph thank-you letter,
Jefferson declared that
[n]o body wishes more than I do to see such proofs as you exhibit, that nature has
given our black brethren, talents equal to those of the other colours of men, and
that the appearance of a want of them is owing merely to the degraded condition
of their existence both in Africa and America.19
D'Souza makes much of this evidence. However, he does not consider a
less famous, but far more revealing letter Jefferson sent to his longtime
political ally and friend Joel Barlow. Shortly after he wrote to Bishop Grdgoire,
Jefferson wrote to Barlow, expressing his true view of the Bishop and his
project to prove the intellectual capacities of blacks and his views of
Banneker's abilities. Jefferson told Barlow:
I believe him [Bishop Gr6goire] a very good man, with imagination enough to
declaim eloquently, but without judgment to decide. He wrote to me also on doubts
I had expressed five or six and twenty years ago, in the Notes of Virginia, as to the
grade of understanding of the negroes, and he sent me his book on the literature of
the negroes. His credulity has made him gather up every story he could find of men
of color, (without distinguishing whether black, or of what degree mixture),
however slight the mention or light the authority on which they are quoted. The
whole do not amount, in point of evidence, to what we know ourselves of
Banneker. We know he had spherical trigonometry enough to make almanacs, but
not without suspicion of aid from Ellicot, who was his neighbor and friend, and
never missed an opportunity of puffing him. I have a long letter from Banneker,
which shows him to have had a mind of very common stature indeed. As to Bishop
Grdgoire, I wrote him, as you have done, a very soft answer.19
Jefferson's letter to Barlow dovetails with his well-known views about
blacks. D'Souza quotes Jefferson's statement from his Notes on the State of
Virginia that "I tremble for my country when I realize that God is just." "
But D'Souza fails to consider Jefferson's profoundly racist statements about
blacks. Jefferson thought that legal or political equality for blacks was
impossible because "the real distinction that nature has made" between the
190. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henri Gr~goire (Feb. 25, 1809), in THE PORTABLE THOMAS
JEFFERSON 517, 517 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975).
191. D'SoUzA, supra note 3, at 590 n.226.
192. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Banneker (Aug. 30, 1791), in 22 PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 97-98 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1986).
193. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joel Barlow (Oct. 8, 1809), in 12 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 321, 321-22 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1904).
194. D'SouzA, supra note 3, at 107.
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races went beyond color and other physical attributes.' Race, more than
their status as slaves, doomed blacks to permanent inequality. In Notes on the
State of Virginia, Jefferson asserted that a harsh bondage did not prevent
Roman slaves from achieving distinction in science, art, or literature because
"they were of the race of whites;" 9 American slaves could never achieve
such distinction because they were not white. Jefferson argued that American
Indians had "a germ in their minds which only [lacks] cultivation;"" 9 they
were capable of "the most sublime oratory." 98 But, he had never found a
black who "had uttered a thought above the level of plain narration; never seen
an elementary trait of painting or sculpture. " ' He found "no poetry" among
blacks.2°° Jefferson argued that blacks' ability to "reason" was "much
inferior" to whites, while "in imagination they are dull, tasteless, and
anomalous,"201 and "inferior to the whites in the endowments of body and
mind."202 Jefferson conceded blacks were brave, but claimed that this was
due to "a want of fore-thought, which prevents their seeing a danger till it be
present. "203
Jefferson's negrophobia was profound. A scientist and naturalist, he
nevertheless accepted and repeated absurdly unscientific and illogical arguments
about the racial characteristics of blacks, speculating that blackness might come
"from the colour of the blood" or that blacks might breed with the "Oran-
ootan." 2  His assertion that black men preferred white women was empiri-
cally insupportable. The reverse was more likely the case, as he surely knew.
Many white men, including his late father-in-law, maintained sexual liaisons
with their slave women.2 5
Jefferson's views on race are in fact embarrassing, not just by the standards
of our age but by the standards of his own age. Tragically, Jefferson's
pseudoscientific proclamations helped foster the subsequent development of
proslavery science, which led to scientific racism. Jefferson helped invent
scientific racism as an intellectually credible viewpoint. As Winthrop Jordan
noted, Jefferson's statements about race "constituted, for all [their] qualifica-
tions, the most intense, extensive, and extreme formulation of anti-Negro
195. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 138 (William Peden ed., 1955).
196. Id. at 142.




201. Id. at 139.
202. Id. at 143.
203. Id. at 139.
204. Id. at 138 (stating that proof of white "superior beauty" could be found in blacks' "own
judgment in favour of the whites, declared by their preference of them, as uniformly as is the preference
of the Oran-ootan for the black women over those of his own species").
205. See supra note 98.
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'thought' offered by any American in the thirty years after the Revolu-
tion."2'6 The very importance of Jefferson to the Founding era helped make
racism respectable in antebellum America. Racism might have developed
without his support for it in the Notes, but it is nevertheless a legacy of
Jefferson.
D'Souza does not examine this legacy of Jefferson, because he imparts to
Jefferson an antislavery attitude that Jefferson did not have. This is, in fact, an
important part of the "new racism" that D'Souza articulates. One of the
assumptions of the "new racism" is that America cannot be a racist society
because we are all "created equal." This, however, is a slippery linguistic
move that does not survive careful scrutiny. It is one thing to believe that we
all should be equal. But the mere articulation of this credo by the Founders did
not in fact make it a social, economic, or political reality.
A thorough examination of Jefferson's views on slavery and race make him
an extremely problematic figure. Jefferson's greatest legacy is the Declaration
of Independence, with its eloquent assertion that we are all "created equal."
But it is clear Jefferson did not mean exactly what he wrote. Otherwise he
could not have kept his slaves. Instead of acting on his own credo and
beginning to free his slaves, Jefferson began to develop an intellectual defense
of slavery based on scientific racism.
VI. CONCLUSION
Like Jefferson, the American Founding was flawed by slavery and racism.
This need not mean that the entire Founding was morally corrupt; but it does
mean there was a taint from the beginning. This was part of our nation's
"original sin." All Americans still struggle with that legacy. To deny it is to
misread all of American history. That denial is part of the "new racism," and
it is a primary component of The End of Racism.
D'Souza is right that we need to reconsider the way we have approached
race in our country. It may be true that affirmative action has evolved into a
mechanistic quota system that is a parody of what it was intended to produce.
This does not mean, however, that we can afford to reject policies which seek
to integrate American society fully. It is also clear that within black communi-
ties violence, drugs, poverty, rejection of education, and teenage motherhood
and single parent (mothers) families undermine the ability of many African
Americans to succeed in the United States.
However correct D'Souza is in identifying the problems of modem
American race relations, his analysis is fatally flawed by his refusal to confront
our rather grim history. D'Souza's title proclaims the "End of Racism," but
206. WINTHROP JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATInTUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO,
1550-1812, at 481 (1968).
Yale Law & Policy Review
his message is mostly that racism has never really been that much of a
problem. This is simply wrong. It is also yet another component of the "new
racism," which denies there ever was much of a problem in order to argue that
we need no social policies to overcome our past or remodel our present.
In the end, D'Souza's fundamental conclusions are wrong. Racism has been
embedded in our culture since at least the 1660s. We have made some dents
in it. The Civil Rights revolution, like the era of Reconstruction, did much to
remove the formal and informal manifestations of racism. The Civil Rights era
also altered some public attitudes. But, like the post-Reconstruction period,
since 1981 the "new racism" has been leading a counter-revolution, not merely
by reversing public policies but, worse yet, by arguing that we need no policies
at all, because we have no problem. Thus the present and the future remain
bleak. In 1903, W.E.B. DuBois predicted that "the problem of the Twentieth
Century is the problem of the color line."' Unfortunately, as we enter the
twenty-first century the problem remains, compounded by the "new racism"
that refuses to even acknowledge the historical or modem manifestations of the
problem. D'Souza's book stands as a heavily footnoted manifesto for this "new
racism."
207. W.E.B. DuBois. THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK at vii (1903).
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